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INTRODUCTION
“Never pull down a fence until you know why 
it was put up” -Robert Frost1
In Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 2 the late eminent scholar Friedrich 
August von Hayek (1899-1992), and what some deem the “Austrian revival,”3
arguably begins and conceivably concludes a genuinely, original discourse 
concerning the taxis and cosmos (Kosmos)4 of institution building.  A neglected 
aspect of Hayek’s contribution to the science of law (jurisprudence) may be his 
discourses on rules and order, and the sources of power.  For this reason, this 
article primarily focuses on Hayek’s Law, Legislation, and Liberty and his 
discourse on taxis, cosmos (Kosmos) and spontaneous order, and not other aspects 
of this writing or other writings.  Because in this respect, his contribution to legal 
scholarship stands apart and risk being neglected by many, especially Law, 
Legislation, and Liberty. 5   In understanding modern Western development 
taxonomies, Hayek’s contributions, albeit arguably inadvertent to the 
1
 Julian L. Simon, Hayek’s Road Comes to an End, The Independent Institute, Commentary 
April 13, 1992, at http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=311. Following Hume, 
Hayek told us that we can never know why many valuable and important customs and systems 
evolved.  Hence he hoped that we give vestigial practices the benefit of our doubt, and perhaps a 
bit more.  His view may be summed up in a phrase attributed to Robert Frost: Never pull down a 
fence until you know why it was put up.
2 See F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Three volumes, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press - 1973-79) [hereinafter Hayek].
3
 Peter G. Klein, Biography F. A. Hayek (1899-1992), Ludwig Von Mises Institute, (Last 
accessed October 6, 2004), http://www.mises.org/content/hayekbio.asp.  Hayek's work is also 
known in political philosophy (Hayek, 1960), legal theory (Hayek 1973-79), and psychology 
(Hayek, 1952).  Within the Austrian school of economics, Hayek's influence, while undeniably 
immense, has very recently become the subject of some controversy.  His emphasis on 
spontaneous order and his work on complex systems has been widely influential among many 
Austrians.  Others have preferred to stress Hayek's work in technical economics, particularly on 
capital and the business cycle, citing a tension between some of Hayek and Mises's views on the 
social order.  (While Mises was a rationalist and a utilitarian, Hayek focused on the limits to 
reason, basing his defense of capitalism on its ability to use limited knowledge and learning by 
trial and error).
4
 Hayek, Id.
5 Id.
understanding of institution building, constitution building, inclusive, remain 
relevant today,6 but are still for the most part seemingly ignored and neglected.  
As one source notes, “Yet despite the ultimate vindication of his work by a 
Nobel Prize in 1974 and the discrediting of both socialism and Keynes, the man 
who predicted it all so very long ago remains largely ignored, at least in the 
America that was for some time his home.”7  No one better understood than 
Hayes did the link between economic freedom and political freedom, and liberty 
and civilization. 8   In the 1970s, Margaret Thatcher when planning for her 
revolution thumped down a copy of Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty before a 
group of Tory researchers, expounding, “This is what we believe.”  Only a year 
earlier in 1998, in Beijing, though earlier banned, a new Chinese translation of 
The Constitution of Liberty became a best-seller, with a subsequent conference 
attracting a veritable Who’s Who of Chinese dissidents.9
In Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Hayek dissected the inner workings of 
institution building and constitution building in that by subtle and meticulous 
piecemeal fashion he presented for us the essential cogs and wheels of requisite 
rules and sources of order for a functioning society vis-à-vis spontaneous order in 
antiquity and modernity.  These meticulous revelations also lend understanding to 
contemporary problems of institution building and constitution modeling, 
especially for those non-Western cultures and nation-states currently undergoing 
institutional and constitutional reform such as the People’s Republic of China 
(China), Afghanistan, Iraq, and other nation-states.  In terms of Western 
institution building, institution building can be generally categorized as institution 
6
 John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman, (eds.), The New Palgrave: A Dictionary 
of Economics, London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1987, Roger W. Garrison and Israel Kirzner, 
Friedrich August von Hayek, at 609-614, also available at
http://www.auburn.edu/~garriro/e4hayek.htm.  Hayek's scholarly output spans more than six 
decades.  Still growing in the mid 1980s, his bibliography (Gray, 1984) includes eighteen books, 
twenty-five pamphlets, sixteen books edited or introduced, and two hundred thirty-five articles.  
Although these publications have brought Hayek international renown and honors in several 
disciplines, his contributions to other social sciences emerged, to a significant degree, as 
extensions of his scholarship in the field of economics and its methodological foundations.
7 Hayek's Revolution, The Wall Street Journal, May 7, 1999.  In 1945, Hayek's “The Road to 
Serfdom” was kept out of Berlin by the Allies lest it offend the Soviets, one of the occupying 
powers.  Mao's China was also quick to ban his works, though the government did publish 
restricted, pirate editions to keep high-ranking cadres abreast of what he was saying; the Chinese 
introduction to “The Road to Serfdom” describes it as "full of poison."  Closer to home, a just-
published Modern Library list of the 20th century's 100 most influential works of nonfiction found 
room for Rachel Carson's "Silent Spring" in the top 10, but left Hayek unmentioned.
8 Hayek’s Revolution, Id.
9 Id.
building prompted by either military force or non-military force that is by the 
forces of politics, economic, military, or combination thereof. 
Hayek’s discourse also lends understanding to an evolving international 
law, as manifest in the appearance of increasingly more international law bodies 
and international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the European 
Union (EU), the Organization of American States (OAS)10 and Mercosur (South 
American Common Market, Mercado Comun del Cono Sur or Southern Cone 
Common Market).11  In terms of IGOs, a prime example of evolving international 
law is the World Trade Organization (WTO).12  Hayek’s discourse equally lends 
to assisting us in understanding the WTO as a world constitution for global trade.  
If the WTO as representative of a world constitution for global trade embodies 
positive law, if not international law legal positivism, 13  then supposed legal 
borrowing pursuant to policies and goals of institution building may negatively 
affect both donors and recipients.  However, and most importantly, Hayek’s 
discourse helps us to understand and possibly resolve problems attendant to the 
transplant, integration and evolution of Western law in non-Western cultures and 
nation-states such as China, Afghanistan, Iraq and other nation-states.  
10 See Organization of American States, http://www.oas.org.  “The Organization of American 
States (OAS) brings together the countries of the Western Hemisphere [. . .] It is the region’s 
premier forum for multilateral dialogue and concerted action.  At the core of the OAS mission is 
an unequivocal commitment to democracy, as expressed in the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter.” 
11 See The official site of the Mercosur secretariat, at http://www.mercosur.org.uy/.  See also 
The EU’s Relation with Mercosur – Overview, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mercosur/intro/. Mercosur was created by Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in March 1991 with the signing of the Treaty of Asuncion.  It 
originally was set up with the ambitious goal of creating a common market/customs union 
between the participating countries.  A transition phase was set to begin in 1995 and to last until 
2006 with a view to constituting the common market. 
12 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO 
Agreement], The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). 
13
 See Ellis Washington, Reply to Judge Richard A. Posner on the Inseparability of Law and
Morality, 3 Rutgers J. Law & Relig. 1, (2001 / 2002).  Although usage of the word “Positive” can 
be traced in the English language as far back as the fourteenth century, this term did not develop 
into an independent, coherent legal theory until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  
Historically, this also corresponded to the height of the secular revival movement called, “The 
Enlightenment Period.”  During this time, men of learning consciously sought to discover 
knowledge solely through the use and development of their own natural faculties, apart from 
acknowledging any divine source.  The two major theorists of Positive law were the British 
philosophers, John Austin (1790-1859) and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832).  The common theme 
throughout their writings insisted that “law as it is” is not necessarily the same as “law as it should 
be.”  In other words, law and morals were viewed as distinct and separated entities.
In addition, as previously mentioned there is the problem of institution 
building by force and coercion, generally brought about by military and non-
military impetus.  Western developed nation-states have employed political, 
economic and military power pursuant to goals of institution building.  
Notwithstanding problems attendant to a mixture of part market systems and part 
commands systems,14 and problems of neo-imperialism,15 institution building by 
force and coercion complicates this issue while further attenuating the problem.  
Although presenting more so a problem of international relations, Hayek’s 
discourse may also lend itself to possibly understanding and resolving the use of 
force and coercion in institution building in that his discourse offers alternative 
international relations policies in goals designed to transplant Western 
institutional designs in non-Western cultures and nation-states.  
For purposes of this article, institution building is considered within a 
broad context.  Ugo Mattei generally described three historical patterns, or models, 
for transplanting law in intended recipient countries.  “A first model is direct 
imperialistic/colonial rule, or imposition of legal patterns by military force.”  
Classic examples are military conquest such as the Napoleonic Code imposed in 
Belgium and McArthur's reforms in post-World War II Japan.  A second model is 
imposition by bargaining such as acceptance of a legal model by a sort of subtle 
blackmail.  In order to gain access to international markets, nations change their 
laws according to Western standards.  Examples can be seen in China, Japan and 
Egypt.  This is the way IGOs such as the World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), WTO and EU effect change in developing countries.  A third model 
is fully consensual, and is presented “as diffusion by prestige, focusing on a 
deliberate process of institutional admiration that leads to the reception of law.”16
14 Wu Zhong, Command economy ghosts haunt China, The Standard China’s Greater China 
Business Newspaper, Online Edition, (10 May 2004), at
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail_frame.cfm?articleid=47442&intcatid=1.  “Although 
15 years of reform have increased China's orientation towards the free market, the residual 
mechanisms of a command economy are still functioning, particularly at regional levels, and 
driving Beijing to resort to administrative means to try to rein in its runaway economy.  The 
increasingly infamous case of Jiangsu Tieben Steel & Iron Company, a privately run steelmaker 
based in Changzhou, Jiangsu province, is a typical example of how the command economy is still 
functioning and how Beijing's policies are ignored and defied in the provinces.  In a free-market 
economy, it is hard to imagine how a company like Tieben, with registered capital of about 600 
million yuan (HK$565.56 million), could run a 10.6-billion-yuan investment project.”
15 See generally John Carlos Rowe, Literary Culture and U.S. Imperialism: From Revolution 
to World War II, Oxford, Oxford UP (2002).  (Rowe sees American imperialism as developing 
along lines similar to its Eastern Europe counter-part).  
16
 See Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and
the Latin Resistance, 10 Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 383, 388-89, (Winter, 2003).
As previously mentioned, for our purposes institution building includes 
constitution building, or constitution modeling for developing countries and 
economies such as in the present case of Iraq.  Moreover, given a greater breathe 
in definitional meaning; institution building equally encompasses the changing 
role of international law as it arguably strives to transform itself into a more 
transnational law.  A prime example of the latter role of changing international 
law can be seen in the force of the dynamics of WTO accession.  It is here that 
China presents a classic example because of its on-going legal and economic 
reforms, or institutional reforms, that are prompted, at least in part,17 by both the 
Protocol on Accession and Trade Review Mechanism (TRM).18  While economic 
in nature, rather than military, the ultimate effect of accession to the WTO has 
meant for China institution building prompted by non-military impetus, which is 
political and economic, rather than by military impetus as seen in the case of 
Iraq.19  Regardless of impetus employed, the result remains the same in both the 
cases of China and Iraq.  Both countries and other developing countries are in the 
midst of institution building, including constitution building, which is for the most 
part dictated on Western terms of development and by Western theories of 
development. 20   The latter begs the question of whether democracy can be 
imposed on a country from without.21
17 See generally Nicholas R. Lardy, Integrating China into the Global Economy, at ch. 2, 
China’s Pre-WTO Trade Reforms, 29-62 (Brookings Institute, 2002).  “China’s trade reforms 
before entry into the World Trade Organization were far reaching but incomplete.”  Id., at 61.
18 Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432 (23 November 
2001) art. 18.4. See also The Transitional Review Mechanism (TRM) or process is unique to 
China, and is required by Article 18 of the Protocol on Accession, 
http://www.uscc.gov/researchreports/2004/stewartpaper/transitionalreviewmechanism(II-b).htm.
19 See generally A. Kevin Reinhart and Gilbert S. Merritt, Reconstruction and constitution 
building in Iraq, vol. 37:3 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 765, May 2004.  (“That is the 
society into which we stepped when we occupied Iraq and the idea that we can import democracy 
in the same sense that you might import a radio or a power plant, is simply a mistake.”)
20
 Mattei, supra note 16, at 388-89.
21 See Paul W. Kahn, The Question of Sovereignty, 40 Stan. J Int'l L. 259, 260-61 (Summer, 
2004), citing at n. 8, John Stuart Mill, A Few Words on Non-Intervention, in Dissertations and 
Discussions, 238-63 (1883).  See also Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust War, 87-91 (1977).
In terms of a broad definitional meaning, the ambit is diverse and wide, 
ranging from seeking assistance from Bretton Woods institutions22 as in the case 
of China to proposed democratic elections under military (marshal) law as in the 
case of Iraq.  The overriding commonality confronting non-Western cultures, 
developing countries, and economies are the conflicts of Western international 
law, Western rule of law and especially Western institution building.  
This article explores Hayek’s postulations concerning both taxis and 
cosmos, in terms of understanding institution and constitution building.  
Specifically this article analyzes the importance of his contributions to 
understanding institution and constitution building in non-Western cultures and 
developing countries and economies.  
Part I of this article begins by addressing, in terms of Ugo Mattei’s 
generally described historical patterns, why China presents an instance of 
institution building by bargaining, while countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan 
offer instances of institution building by military force.  Next, this article 
addresses Hayek’s discourse on rules and order, by discussing sources of power in 
terms of taxis and cosmos (Kosmos), in conjunction with notions of deliberate 
design and spontaneous order.
Part II of this article analyzes the issues of taxis and cosmos in terms of 
both contemporary application and problems.  This article discusses the issues of 
taxis and cosmos in terms of institution and constitution building, and in the 
context of institution building prompted by military and non-military impetus, or 
by politics, economics and military force and coercion.  In doing so, this article 
will juxtapose Western institution building models with economic, political and 
legal particularities of non-Western institutions with emphasis directed toward 
institutional and constitutional reform and an evolution of Western law in non-
Western cultures and developing nation-states, such as, China, Afghanistan and 
Iraq. In conclusion, this article discusses the importance of Hayek’s contributions 
22
 Generally, the WTO, IMF and World Bank.  The International Monetary Fund (IMF), at 
http://www.imf.org/.  “The IMF is an organization of 184 countries, working to foster global 
monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high 
employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty.”  The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or (World Bank), See The World Bank Group, at 
http://www.worldbank.org/.  (Explaining that The World Bank consists of five institutions: 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; International Development Association; 
International Finance Corporation; Multilateral Investment Guarantees Agency; International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.  In the World Bank Group, there are also the 
regional development banks, such as the Inter-American Development Bank).).  The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT-1947).  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm.  WTO Agreement, supra note 9.
to the field of institution and constitution building, and the possibilities that may 
stem from Hayek’s discourse for new directions in Western institution building, 
constitution building and international relations.
I. INSTITUTIONS AND SPONTANEOUS ORDER
A. Institution Building by Bargaining
China is an example of Western institution building by non-military means.  
China is in the midst of economic and legal reform.  The commencement of these 
reforms is generally attributable to the Deng Xiaoping era.23  They are economic 
and legal reforms that respectively date the Deng Xiaoping era and China’s entry 
into the WTO.  The significance of reforms in light of its entry into the WTO is 
the influence of WTO membership on both past and present reforms, especially 
implementation of rule of law.  
In terms of international law and politics, the most vexing issue 
surrounding China’s entry into the WTO has been the implementation of rule of 
law.  A problem for China and non-Western nation-states is that rule of law is a 
legal concept of Western origin, as equally true of international law.  The WTO is 
an IGO serving as a constitution for global trade, grounded in Western 
international law and reflecting its Western origins and Western norms.24
This presents a problem in constitution modeling.  The United States’ 
constitution has been hailed as a world model for constitution writing nation-
states.25  Despite economic and cultural variants stemming from its use as a model 
for world constitutionalism, it still survives as a model against which to measure 
constitutionalism, at least in terms of Western political economy constitutional 
designs.  This poses problems for non-Western nation-states such as China that 
are undergoing process of amendments and revisions of constitutions for the 
23 See J.A.G. Roberts, A concise history of China, 204 (Harvard University Press) (1999).  (In 
1992, Deng Xiaoping visited Shenzhen in Guangdong Province and officially declared China will 
adopt a socialist market economy, which many actually attribute as commencing modernization.).
24 See Wang Yanzhong, Chinese Values, Governance, and International Relations: Historical 
Development and Present Situation, in Changing Values in Asia: their Impact on Governance and 
Development, 19 (Han Sung-Joo ed., Japan Center for Int’l Exchange) (1999).  (“Because the 
civilization of modern industry first appeared in Western countries and then spread to non-Western 
countries, the modernization of non-Western countries is, first of all, a process of accepting the 
civilization of Western industrialization.”).  Id, at 37.
25 See Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the Rise of the 
World Constitutionalism, 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 597, 604-13, (2000).
purpose of seeking compliance with WTO reforms via Protocol on Accession, 
especially requirement of implementing rule of law.26
The distinctiveness of China lies in fact that accession follows the 1991 
breakup of the Soviet Union and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(COMECON or CMEA), which was the economic and trading system of East 
European countries connected to the Soviet Union.27  The breakup of the Soviet 
Union created possibility of additional transition economies seeking GATT 
membership.  Because rules of accession for China would serve as a model for 
additional transition economies, Western developed countries implicitly created 
special conditions and rigorous accession terms for China.28
The WTO is the most legalized, if not judicialized, IGO.29  Presently, the 
WTO Protocol on Accession mechanism is being used to engage institution 
building in non-Western developing nation-states such as China.  In terms of 
IGOs such as the WTO,30  and the original goals and policies of the Bretton 
Woods institutions31 one finds institution building being attempted by means of 
economic and political coercion, rather than by military force and coercion.  
Another example in terms of China may well be America’s use of economic and 
political coercion in addressing the China yuan controversy, which is a U.S. –
China trade controversy.32
26
 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, Art. 2(A)3 reads, 
“China shall administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations, 
rules, decrees, directives, administrative guidance, policies and other measures…pertaining to or 
affecting trade in goods, services, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights or the control 
of foreign exchange.”
27
 THE COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE [Excerpted from 
Czechoslovakia: A Country Study, Glenn E. Curtis, ed. (Washington, D. C.: Federal Research 
Division of the Library of Congress, 1992).], at http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/CMEA.html.  THE 
FOUNDING of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (also referred to as Comecon, 
CMEA, CEMA, or the Council) dates from a 1949 communiqué agreed upon by the Soviet Union, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.  The precise reasons for Comecon's 
formation in the aftermath of World War II are quite complex, given the political and economic 
turmoil of that time.
28
 Lardy, supra note 17, at 63.
29 See Dirk De Bièvre, International Institutions and Domestic Coaltions: The Differential 
Effects of Negotiations and Judicialization in European Trade Policy, European University 
Institute, Florence, EUI Working Party SPS No. 2003/17, at 9-10, at http:// 
www.iue.it/PUB/sps2003-17.pdf.
30 See WTO Agreement.
31 See Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (Routledge 7th 
ed. 1997), at 223–25.
32 See Focus: Escalating pressure on yuan revaluation, ChinaDaily HK Edition (4 November 
2004), available at http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/200311/04/content_278165.htm.
The United States, in conjunction with other Western dominant powers, 
effects Chinese institution building, constitution building, inclusive, via the WTO 
and its Protocol on Accession mechanism33 and TRM.34  The process of engaging 
institution building in especially China has been enhanced by the TRM.35  China's 
2001 accession to the WTO was not the culmination of the transformation of its 
trading system and accession obligations.  Other WTO members assessing that 
China needed to accomplish substantial changes over a period of years before it 
would be in full compliance with all of the WTO obligations established an 
annual monitoring mechanism, which focused on China's compliance progress 
with its WTO commitments.36  In the Protocol on Accession, China agreed to an 
annual review of the implementation process.37  The Protocol on Accession also 
refers to this annual process as the TRM.  Commenced in 2002, the TRM will 
operate for eight consecutive years followed by with one final review of China's 
compliance and implementation process in the tenth year subsequent to 
accession.38
B. Institution Building by Military Force
Prime examples of institution building, including constitution building, by 
military force and coercion are arguably demonstrated by the cases of 
33 Wto Accessions: Work In The Wto, Protocols of accession for new members since 1995, 
including commitments in goods and services, (October 2004), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm.
34 See Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432 (23 November 
2001). See also The Transitional Review Mechanism (TRM) or process is unique to China, and is 
required by Article 18 of the Protocol on Accession, available at 
http://www.uscc.gov/researchreports/2004/stewartpaper/transitionalreviewmechanism(II-b).htm.
35 Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432 (23 November 
2001) art. 18.4.
36 See Pub. L. 106-286, div. B, Title IV, § 401, Oct. 10, 2000, 114 STAT. 900. The United 
States, for example, explicitly made an annual review of China's compliance with its WTO 
obligations an element of its national trade policy.  In the bill that extended nondiscriminatory 
treatment (normal trade relations treatment) to the People's Republic of China, Congress expressly 
provided:  ‘It shall be the objective of the United States to obtain as part of the Protocol of 
Accession of the People's Republic of China to the WTO, an annual review within the WTO of the 
compliance by the People's Republic of China with its terms of accession to the WTO.
37 Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432 (23 November 
2001) art. 18.4.
38 Id.
Afghanistan 39  and Iraq, 40  especially in their bid for democratically elected 
legislatures.  In both cases institution building, constitution building, inclusive, 
was prompted by military impetus.  In terms of success or failure, it is hoped that 
democratic elections in Afghanistan will be hailed as a model of success that Iraq 
will subsequently follow.41
Admittedly, there are pundits subscribing to a theory that an America-led 
war, in conjunction with coalition forces, against Iraq is illegal in terms of 
international law.  The latter presents issue of whether war against Iraq, especially 
for purpose of institution building, is illegal under the principle of justum bellos,42
if not jus ad bellum (just war).  Nonetheless, a problem for these pundits is that a 
so-call international law community, the United Nations (UN), arguably 
39 The Whitehouse, President George Bush, Three Years of Progress in the War on Terror,
Fact Sheet, For Immediate Release, Office of the Press Secretary, September 11, 2004, at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040911.html. Three Years of Progress: We 
have followed this strategy -- defending the peace, protecting the peace, and extending the peace --
for nearly three years, and the results are now clear for all to see.  Afghanistan: Three years ago, 
Afghanistan was the home base of al-Qaida -- a country ruled by the Taliban, one of the most 
backward and brutal regimes of modern history.  Today, a presidential election is scheduled for 
this fall, the terror camps are closed, and the Afghan government is helping us to hunt the Taliban 
and terrorists in remote regions.  Today, because we acted to liberate Afghanistan, a threat has 
been removed, and the American people are safer.
40 Id.  Today, the dictator who caused decades of death and turmoil -- who twice invaded his 
neighbors, who harbored terrorist leaders, and used chemical weapons, is finally before the bar of 
justice.  Iraq is now becoming an example of reform to the region.  Iraqi security forces are 
fighting beside coalition troops to defeat terrorists and foreign fighters.  Today, because America 
and our coalition helped to end the violent regime of Saddam Hussein, and because we are helping 
to raise a peaceful democracy in its place, the American people are safer.
41 See Jim Hoagland, Elections in Iraq and Afghanistan, The Washington Post, (June 20, 
2004), available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20040620/news_1e20hoagland.html.  
“Perelli, director of the U.N.'s electoral assistance division, announced last month that she would 
recommend postponing the crucial Iraqi national elections scheduled for January 2005 ‘if the 
security situation does not improve.’”
42 See Hans Kelsen, (transl. Max Knight), The Pure Theory of Law, The Regents of the 
University of California 1967), at 321-22.  The first holds that according to general international 
law, war is neither a delict nor a sanction, every state may go to war for whatever reason, without 
violating international law.  The second holds that war, even according to general international law, 
is permissible only as a reaction against a violation of international law.  War, like reprisal, is itself 
a delict, unless it is a sanction.  This is the so-called principle of bellum iustum.
sanctioned and authorized war against Iraq.43 On September 12, 2001, President 
Bush announced the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive first strike,44 which the UN 
General Assembly and Security Council arguably authorized by resolution.45  The 
issues surrounding principle of justum bellos are necessarily related to the legality 
of Western institution building in non-Western cultures and nation-states, 
especially when the impetus for reconstruction is military force and coercion.  
A problem of an American-led war against Iraq directly relates to issue of 
purposeful Western institution building.  An issue still in dispute is whether the 
Bush Administration entered office with an original intent of institution building 
in Iraq, that is, determined to effect a change in the governmental regime of Iraq.46
In 1998, The Project of the New American Century, an organization comprising 
prominent citizens, requested that President Clinton “enunciate a new strategy that 
would secure the interests of the U.S. and our friends and allies around the world.  
That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime 
from power.”  Some of those signatories were Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, who become senior 
cabinet members in the Bush Administration.47  In terms of institution building by 
military impetus, war may well be what Carl von Clausewitz described over one 
hundred and seventy-five years ago as a “continuation of politics (Politik) by 
other means.”48
43 See Ibrahim J. Gassama, International Law at a Grotian Moment: The Invasion of Iraq in 
Context, 18 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 1, 13-14, Spring, 2004. According to the Attorney General, “all of 
these resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which allows the use of force 
for the express purpose of restoring international peace and security.”  Resolution 678 (1990) 
provided the underlying authority for the use of force to eject Iraq from Kuwait (“all necessary 
means”) and to restore Kuwait's sovereignty, with the goal of reinstating international peace and 
security in the area.  According to Lord Goldsmith, Resolution 687 (1991) “suspended but did not 
terminate” the authority to use force under Resolution 678, and imposed numerous obligations on 
Iraq. . .  “A material breach of Resolution 687,” in Lord Goldsmith's view, “revives the authority 
to use force under 678.”  Resolution 1441 declared Iraq in “material breach” of its obligations 
under previous Security Council resolutions, gave it a final opportunity to comply with those 
obligations, and warned of "serious consequences" if it failed to comply fully.
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C. Taxis and Cosmos (Kosmos)
“[I]t is the concepts and the views held by 
individuals which are directly known to us and 
which form the elements from which we must 
build up, as it were, the more complex 
phenomena...” - Hayek (1952)49
The contributions of Hayek to the field of law and other disciplines are 
many and lasting.  Many rank him among the greatest members of the Austrian 
school, and as one of the leading economists of the twentieth century.  His work 
remains influential in the areas of business-cycle theory, comparative economic 
systems, political and social philosophy, legal theory, and even cognitive 
psychology.50
The writings of Hayek, in particular, Law, Legislation, and Liberty,
engage us, yet, while in the same moment distracts us to no end.  It is perhaps for 
this reason he described himself as a puzzler or muddler, rather than the heir 
apparent master of his subject.51  Nonetheless, he remains the perceptible genius 
because of his writings and the continuing influence of his writings.  Hayek, 
through his writings, continues to influence discourses in modern society.  He also 
continues to reveal himself in different disciplines, subtle forms and ideas.  The 
most obvious of which are his discourses on taxis and cosmos (Kosmos).
In terms of societal rules and order, Hayek discerns that prevailing 
scientific and political views are contingent on a particular conception of the 
formation of social institutions.  The latter is labeled constructivist rationalism, 
which is a concept assuming that all social institutions are, and ought to be, 
products of deliberate design.  This contention manifests an intellectual tradition 
that he deems false in its factual and normative conclusions.  The latter is true 
because “all” institutions are not “all” the products of design.  It is an erroneous 
view reflective of an intellectual tradition that connects with a false conception of 
the human mind as an entity positioned outside the cosmos of nature and society.  
Rather, he perceived the human mind as being the product of the same process of 
evolution that society’s institutions are due.52
49 See Frederick August von Hayek, The Counter-Revolution Of Science: Studies On Abuse Of 
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In terms of constructivist rationalism, Hayek distinguished between two 
schools of thought, both constituting a form of rationalism: evolutionary (critical) 
rationalism and the erroneous constructivist (naïve) rationalism. 53   A critical 
concern for him is the assumptions upon which constructivist rationalism is based.  
For Hayek, factually false assumptions challenge a host of scientific and political 
doctrinaires, such as, legal positivism, unlimited sovereign power, utilitarianism, 
sociology and other schools of thought, including the social contract theories 
(contractarianism) of the Enlightenment era.   
When Montesquieu and the framers of the American Constitution 
articulated the conception of a limiting constitution that had grown up 
in England, they set a pattern which liberal constitutionalism has 
followed ever since.  Their chief aim was to provide institutional 
safeguards of individual freedoms; and the device in which they 
placed their faith was the separation of powers.  In the form in which 
we know this division of power between the legislature, the judiciary, 
and the administration, it has not achieved what it meant to achieve.  
Governments everywhere have obtained by constitutional means 
powers which those men had meant to deny them.  The first attempt to 
secure individual liberty by constitutions has evidently failed54
While announcing that the latter form of constitutionalism has failed, 
Hayek still recognized that constitutionalism means limited government.55  Now, 
Hayek, to use his own words, begins to puzzle and muddle us.  For Hayek’s 
factually false assumptions the contributing forces are not value.  Rather, these 
assumptions manifest a perverse misconception of the forces that made the “Great 
Society” and civilization possible.56  Further writing on false assumptions, and the 
problem of a polity limiting popular will without placing another will above it, he 
wrote the following.
As soon as we recognize that the basic order of the Great Society cannot 
rest entirely on design, and can therefore also not aim at particular 
foreseeable results, we see that the requirement, as legitimation of all 
authority, of a commitment to general principles approved by the general 
opinion, may well place effective restrictions on the particular will of all 
authority, including that of the majority of the moment.57
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It is in terms of taxis and cosmos (Kosmos) that he addressed his concerns 
with problems of the order of the Great Society resting on design, which he 
characterized as the problem of deliberate design.
As previously mentioned Hayek discerns between evolutionary (critical) 
rationalism and the erroneous constructivist (naïve) rationalism.58  The doctrinaire, 
rather than doctrine, of evolutionary (critical) rationalism maintains that 
institutions serve human purposes only if such institutions have been deliberately 
designed for such purposes.59  He largely deems false the belief underlying such 
propositions, “that we owe all beneficial institutions to design, and that only such 
design has made or can make them useful for our purpose.”60
Conversely, Hayek perceived that the doctrinaire of erroneous 
constructivist (naïve) rationalism holds that a society’s orderliness that greatly 
increased the effectiveness of individual action is not due solely to institutions and 
practices invented or designed for that purpose.  Rather, it is largely due to 
respective processes of growth and evolution.  These process, albeit adopted for
others reasons or by accident, are preserved since “they enabled the group in 
which they had arisen to prevail over others.”61
By ‘order’ we shall thoughout describe a state of affairs in which a 
multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so related to each other 
that we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or 
temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations concerning the 
rest, or at least expectations which have a good chance of proving 
correct.62
Hayek’s central thesis on sources of order, and suggested synonyms of 
system, structure or patterns, concern the “made” and “grown” orders.63  The fact 
of societal order is a truism because without order society would be in chaos.  He 
considered this requisite societal order for a functioning society to be the by-
product of combined intentions and expectations, which ultimately determine the 
actions of different individuals.  It is in this form that order manifests in social life, 
and presents the critical question of how such an order comes about.64
For Hayek, the answers are found in the sources of order.  He addressed 
the notion of deliberate design such as “a deliberate arrangement by somebody.”  
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It is a concept suffering disfavor by friends of liberty and supposedly favored by 
authoritarians.  The authoritarian concept is based on the belief that order can only 
be created by forces external to the system (exogenously).  Conversely, it has no 
application to an equilibrium created from within (endogenously) such as the 
general theory of the market.  Spontaneous order gravely differs from made order.  
He described each kind of order as follows.65
The made order which we have already referred to as an exogenous 
order or an arrangement may again be described as a construction, an 
artificial order or, especially where we have to deal with a directed 
social order, as an organization.  The grown order, on the other hand, 
which we have referred to as a self-generating or endogenous order, is 
in English most conveniently described as a spontaneous order.66
He further employed classical Greek to describe the two sources of order, 
namely, taxis for a made order, and kosmos (cosmos) for a grown order.  The 
latter, kosmos (cosmos) originally meaning “a right order in a state or a 
community.”67
For Hayek’s spontaneous order, a well-functioning system was constructed 
neither by deliberate design, nor by deliberate construction of exogenous forces 
and endogenous forces.  Throughout Law, Legislation, and Liberty, he referred to 
spontaneous order in terms of the market, common law, custom, language, science, 
and society.68
Historically, in earlier periods, man deemed language and even morals as 
having been invented by “some genius of the past.”  Generally, it is now 
recognized, especially by social theorists, that they are the result or outcome of a 
process of evolution, not the product of deliberate design.  In terms of 
spontaneous order, it is especially in the field of economics that it is observed to 
engender special concerns.  A classic example of Adam Smith’s expression of the 
“invisible hand,” presents such a controversy because Smith described man as 
being led “to promote an end which was no part of his intentions.”69  In respect, 
the chaos of economic affairs may well be reflective of complete absence of 
order.70
The gist of Hayek’s discourse on taxis and cosmos is that spontaneous 
order cannot aim at concrete purposes, because an order “not made” does exist.  A 
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primary concern of Hayek was discovering why many do not readily recognize 
this supposed truism.71
II. THE COSMOS OF INSTITUTION BUILDING
Assuming arguendo the new global economy manifest “made” order 
rather than cosmos presents critical issue of the relationship between a possible
order “not made” in non-Western cultures and developing nation-states, and 
Western institution building by developed nation-states and IGOs such as the 
WTO that are dominated by developed nation-states.  It also presents issue of the 
consequences attaching to institution building in non-Western cultures and nation-
states.  Institution building, constitution building, inclusive, ultimately affects 
both the donor and recipients of institution building.  In terms of Hayek’s 
categories of sources of order, it may negatively affect the arguable cosmos 
(Kosmos) of non-Western cultures and nation-states.  As for Western developed 
nation-states, in terms of Hayek’s categories of sources of order, institution 
building may constitute no more in reality than an exercise in political, if not neo-
realist or neo-liberalist, futility.  Because his discourse challenged not only law in 
general, but also the very foundations of Western notions of law by contending 
there are factually false assumptions that challenge a host of scientific and 
political doctrinaires.
Hayek’s discourse offers an alternative means of gauging the success or 
failure of institution building in developing nation-states by developed nation-
states.  His cosmos may be predictive of success or failure in Western institution 
building.  A consequence of failure, to the disdain of the Western world may 
produce negative consequences affecting the donors, or recipients, or both.
Moreover, it presents the critical issue of how we should define the rule of 
law, and what implementation strategies will advance both incorporation of the 
rule of law and a new global economy, or world order.  Normative legal 
positivism appears as a ready solution due to its notion that law is a set of 
commands as suggested by the tradition of imperative legal positivism of John 
Austin,72 or even arguably, a Hayekian taxis by deliberate design.  For John 
Austin a proposition of law was true if it simply reported correctly the past 
commands of a political society.73
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In the event a definition for rule of law can be contained within the 
discipline of normative legal positivism or the normative positivist analysis of the 
concept of law, then rule of law presents itself as a West centric concept of law 
whose incorporation into non-Western cultures and developing nation-states poses 
certain problems.  H. L. A. Hart’s rejection of John Austin’s imperative legal 
positivism arguably addressed the same problem.74  In the Concept of Law (1961), 
Hart contended that the true grounds of law lie in the acceptance by the 
community as a whole of a fundamental master rule, being Hart’s rule of 
recognition.  This rule assigns to a particular person or groups the authority to 
make law.75  Therefore, rules of law are true not just in virtue of commands, but, 
more importantly, “in virtue of social conventions that represent the community’s 
acceptance of a scheme of rules empowering such people or groups to create valid 
law.”76
It is readily apparent that the issue presented is one a clash of cultures that 
is the invocation of West centric law, or rule of law, into non-Western nation-
states.  The earlier thesis of Samuel Huntington speaks to the same variety of 
societal and cultural issues. 77   However, the issue is viewable in a different 
perspective, rather than simply a clash of cultures.  In terms of Hayek’s discourse, 
the critical issue may very well lie in a clash of modern day taxis versus cosmos 
(Kosmos).  It is also a modern day taxis-cosmos conflict reflecting, to a certain 
extent, what survives and remains of antiquity in both Western and non-Western 
cultures and nation-states.  
There are problems in defining the rule of law.  Its multifarious nature has 
lent to different meanings in different concepts and different legal systems.  There 
seems not to be a consensus on what the rule of law means, or even what it stands 
against.  One sources observes that rule of law has both a descriptive and 
prescriptive content.  “Like the concepts of ‘liberty’ or ‘equality,’ the descriptive 
meaning of ‘the rule of law’ is dependent on the prescriptive meaning one 
ascribes to it; in the context of complex contemporary polities there likely will be 
vigorous disagreements concerning the relevant prescriptive standards at stake.”  
74 See generally H. L. A. Hart, The Concept Of Law, ch. 1 Persistent Questions, Oxford 
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As a result, it has come to mean different things for different legal traditions such 
as Anglo-American rule of law, German Rechtsstaat and French L'Etat de droit.78
For Hayek, the concept of law was also subject to differing interpretations, 
because of differing interpretations concerning the concept of the “purpose” of 
law.79  He seemingly intimated that law is a necessary condition for forming a 
spontaneous order of actions.  While doing so, he also announced it a difficult 
concept to formulate without required explanations of order by social theory, 
which was, of course, economics.80  He is again critical of Cartesian rationalism 
and those that follow it.81  Because “[t]he preservation of an enduring system of 
abstract relationships, or of the order of a cosmos with constantly changing 
content, did not fit into what men ordinarily understood by a purpose, goal or end 
of deliberate action.”82  This is necessarily true because generally law does not 
serve any “purpose,” except for what he described as “countless different 
purposes of different individuals.”  Since law is not a “means to any purpose,” it 
fit well within Hayek’s scheme of things, especially spontaneous order.83
A problem of Hayek is inklings of legal positivism.  He may well have 
been what he claimed not to be and not what he so strongly attested to being.  In 
addressing the conception of the “purpose” of law, Hayek seems to have been 
balancing a need for taxis against cosmos and spontaneous order, rather than just 
differing “purposes” attributable to the concept of law.  Although Hayek was an 
economist if one had to characterize him in terms of legal philosophies, he was 
more so, than not, a legal positivist.  Because in his analysis of the concept of law, 
he is constantly balancing taxis against cosmos, a Kantian purposeless character 
of rules against Utilitarianism’s purpose as central feature of law, and natural law 
against positivism.  Admittedly, he does not go to the extremes of legal positivism 
such as the imperative legal positivism of John Austin, but neither does he go to 
78 See Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule Of Law And The Legitimacy Of Constitutional Democracy, 
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opposite extremes of Cartesian rationalism, if not contractarianism.  In this respect, 
he resembled a sort of tempered positivist, perhaps in the tradition of H. L. A. 
Hart.  In many ways, Hayek’s taxis, cosmos, and spontaneous order, at least in 
terms of methodology, bears resemblance to Hart’s primary rules and secondary 
rules.  
In a quest for spontaneous order, Hayek insisted upon cosmos, grown 
order.  However, grown order had to be refined, to a certain extent, by taxis, 
“made” order, thus allowing for abstract concepts (relations) so long as they are 
only defined by abstract properties.84  There are conventional or normative rules 
that tell us what we ought and ought not to do.  There are also rules such as the 
rules of law that are the “chief instrument whereby we can affect the resulting 
order.”  For Hayek the rules upon which spontaneous order rest need not always 
be of spontaneous origin, which are cosmos, grown order.  “Although 
undoubtedly an order originally formed itself spontaneously because individuals 
followed rules which had not been deliberately made but had arisen spontaneously, 
people gradually learned to improve those rules; and it is at least conceivable that 
the formation of a spontaneous order relies entirely on rules that were deliberately 
made.”  Rules of law, mostly, but not all, will be the product of deliberate design, 
whereas most rules of conduct and morals will be the product of spontaneous 
growth.  The spontaneous order produces a resulting order.  Particular 
manifestations of rules depend on circumstances that the designers of rules did not 
know and could not have known.  In turn, the particular content of order reflects 
circumstances known only to persons who obey the rules and apply them to facts 
only they know.  “It will be through the knowledge of these individuals both of 
the rules and of the particular facts that both will determine the resulting order.”85
Comparatively, and methodologically resembling Hayek’s taxis and 
cosmos, Hart in The Concept of Law (1961) distinguished between primary and 
secondary rules.  The primary rules tell us what we can and cannot do, while, 
secondary rules allows for the creation, alteration and extinction of legal rules and 
legal relations.86  Hart’s secondary rules also arguably determine the future of 
legal institutions, in that they reflect the importance of constitutionalism in 
institutionalizing legal institutions, especially IGOs such as the WTO.  The latter 
also presents the problem of constitution making at the international level, 
including the WTO, paralleling similar concerns of national constitutions, power 
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and legitimacy (recognition).87  It is a question of power and controlling power,88
especially determining the limits and channels of political authority and legal 
authority.  In terms of national constitutions and constitutionalism, which applies 
to international organizations such as the WTO, ultimately, power, although state-
centered or domestic, is controlled by what are termed meta-rules, pre-
constitutional rules and meta-constitutional rules, or meta-constitutionalism and 
the unwritten rules that tell us how constitutions operate. 89   Hart’s primary-
secondary rules dichotomy strongly resembles Hayek’s taxis-cosmos dichotomy.  
Nonetheless, when one comes to realization that law, especially rule of law, 
is not merely a set of commands, a statement of the problem truly begins to take 
form.  A form takes shape in a definitional meaning of rule of law.  A worthy 
definition of rule of law is not simply a set of commands; rather it encompasses a 
reality reflective of the political and economics forces in a society.  Most 
problematic is that given its Western origins, rule of law must necessarily be 
defined within the ambit of West centric political and economic forces and 
taxonomies.  In this context, rule of law is best described as “neither a rule nor a 
law” in that “it is generally understood as a doctrine of political morality, which 
concentrates on the role of law in securing the correct balance of rights and 
powers between individuals and the state in free and civilized societies.” 90
Admittedly, there are problems attendant to this definition.  Assuming arguendo
this definition correctly reflects Western jurisprudence in modernity; it also 
presents the critical issue of an invocation of West centric political morality into 
non-Western cultures and nation-states.  
The problem is further attenuated by the distinction between the reality 
and the model of Western jurisprudence in modernity, especially in terms of 
American jurisprudence.  A model of U.S. constitutionalism is grounded in the 
deliberations of the founding fathers, which is reflective of the original 
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Enlightenment tradition. 91   Conversely, the reality of modern U.S. 
constitutionalism reflects a watering down effect over the years that is an 
evolution from original Enlightenment agenda to what one sources deems a more 
“moderate” Enlightenment.92  The assumption that the original Enlightenment 
tradition is no more begs the question of what law or rule of law Western nation-
states, who are dominant in international power politics, are intending to 
transplant into non-Western nation-states under the auspices of IGOs such as the 
WTO.  American foundational values are grounded in the Enlightenment 
philosophies, evolved to neo-realism, eventually, manifesting American 
unilateralism, or America as the indispensable nation.93  The problem of remnants 
of the Enlightenment era, as one source notes, is that “Enlightenment rationality 
has been so successfully ingrained in our processes, forms, and practices, that, 
ironically, we have (almost) completely lost the quintessentially Enlightenment 
capacity to question.”94  Americans have come to believe in their own rationality 
in a fundamentalist manner.  “The rationality of the Enlightenment has become so 
successful, so hegemonic, that it has become immobilized through its own 
institutions.”95
As previously mentioned Hayek perceived that, an order “not made” that 
is grown does exist, which he deemed a readily recognizable truism.96  Assuming 
an order “not made” does exist, is this equally true in terms of non-Western 
cultures and nation-states?  In addition, what taxis will serve as an effective 
implementation strategy for transplanting a Western constitutional design in non-
Western cultures and nation-states?  The latter presents a critical problem for U.S. 
constitutionalism or world constitutionalism as concerns non-Western nation-
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states, and their incorporation, transplant, or more accurately legal borrowing,97 of 
the Western rule of law.  
The discourse of Hayek on taxis, cosmos (Kosmos) and deliberate design 
challenges the legitimacy of United States constitutionalism as a model for world 
constitutionalism, Chinese constitutionalism and Islamic constitutionalism.98  His 
discourse challenges the very foundations of the American ideal, which are the 
ideals of the founding fathers emanating from the original Enlightenment tradition.  
However, the challenges of Hayek’s discourse do not necessarily evolve to a 
factual responsibility for actually disreputing the original American 
Enlightenment tradition.  The demise of the Enlightenment tradition from its 
original colonial days is arguably commenced during the gilded age of America, a 
period in history marked by economic and political corruption.99  The demise of 
the original colonial American Enlightenment tradition parallels a period in 
American history known as the gilded age.  The changes in American 
jurisprudence correspond with the changing politics and economics of an 
American society transitioning to a progressive era.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
arguably, the paradigmatic American legal realist may have contributed to our 
transition from an original Enlightenment tradition to “moderate” Enlightenment.  
In the Path of the Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote the following.
I look forward to a time when the part played by history in the 
explanation of dogma shall be very small, and instead of ingenious 
research we shall spend our energy on a study of the ends sought to be 
attained and the reasons for desiring them.  As a step toward that ideal 
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it seems to me that every lawyer ought to seek an understanding of 
economics.100
While attributing great significance to an understanding of economics, if 
not, the blending of law and economics, Holmes neither mentioned, nor perhaps 
envisioned, an admixture of politics, or political science, to this societal mix.  
Arguably, at the turn of the nineteenth century, he did not envision the trials and 
tribulations of international law and politics, in terms of modernity, if not post-
modernity,101 and its attendant political, socio-economic and legal forces.  
In terms of China, this is especially true when one considers the dynamics 
of Chinese politics and its history of constitutional government dating from the 
Sino-British post-Opium War (1839-1842) to modernity, with its many twists and 
turns, especially in terms of sovereignty and nationalism.102   For China, this 
historical journey of political growth parallels a history of international law and 
trade, from the original preferential trading arrangements of the British Empire 
(Opium War),103 to the WTO and its dialectic and economic visions of world 
order.104  China’s historical journal, at least in the sense of classical international 
law (1648-1918)105 and modern international law, presents problems for Western 
institution building such as that undertaken by the United States and other 
developed countries.  
In terms of distinguishable historical, cultural and legal particularities, the 
situation is no less dramatic with other non-Western cultures and developing 
countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq.  One source noted that Chinese, Indian, 
Egyptian and Greek civilizations manifest anachronisms in modernity, offering at 
100 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harvard Law Review 457 (1897), 
available at Project Gutenberg, http://digital.library.upenn.edu/webbin/gutbook/lookup?num=2373.
101 See Paul Harris, The Birth of the Postmodern, the Rebirth of the Tribe: Contradiction and 
Change in Contemporary New Zealand, University of New Zealand, University of Waikota, 
Hamilton, New Zealand available at
http://employees.csbsju.edu/jmakepeace/perspectives2001/Harris2001.jmm.html.  “Postmodernity 
is a ‘purportedly new state of world affairs’ which has been emerging since the 1960’s . . . For 
some analysts, postmodernity is but the latest phase of capitalism.”
102 See Suiseheng Zhao, Chinese Nationalism and Its International Orientations, Political 
Science Quarterly, vol. 115, no. 1 (Spring 2000).
103 See William Travis Hanes and Frank Sanello, The Opium Wars: The Addiction of One 
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1999.
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best marginally, practical working political and legal ideologies in today’s 
world.106
There are, of course, many religious, psychological, and political 
reasons for this, but all of these reasons derive from a sense that so far 
as the West is concerned, Islam represents not only a formidable 
competitor but also a latecoming challenge to Christianity. . . . Islam 
was believed to be a demonic religion of apostasy, blasphemy, and 
obscurity. . . . It was as if a younger, more virile and energetic version 
of Christianity had arisen in the East. . . . Only Islam seemed never to 
have submitted completely to the West; and when, after the dramatic 
oil-price rises of the early 1970s, the Muslim world seemed once more 
on the verge of repeating its early conquests, the whole West seemed 
to shudder.107
Problematic for Western institution building is that Islamic political 
ideology is a worldwide phenomenon, representing a “complex iteration of 
Quranic inspiration and reformist, fundamental orientation.”108
Hayek perceived the problem of institution building, especially in terms of 
law, as one of a “complex relationship between values and facts.”  It is a problem 
of blending these values and facts, and a resulting complex social structure “that 
exist only because the individuals composing them hold certain values.”  
Assuming arguendo applicability to Western institution building, he further posits 
in terms of proposed modifications or improvements of existing orders that, “he 
[social scientist] will have to accept the values which are indispensable for its 
existence, as it would clearly be inconsistent to try to improve some particular 
aspect of the order and at the same time propose means that would destroy the 
values on which the whole order rests.”109  Hayek is addressing the problem 
confronted by social scientists seeking to study complex social structures, which 
only exist because individuals hold certain values.110
A problem of the disciples of political science, economics and law, is that 
they are social sciences, if not moral sciences,111 rather than pure sciences, such as, 
106 See Maimul Ahsan Khan, Human Rights in the Muslim World Fundamentalism, 
Constitutionalism, and International Politics, (Carolina Academic Press 2003).
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engineering, physics and math.112  Moreover, even pure science does not use 
“observation or experiments in the world, but instead uses only reason and logic 
in the form of non-specific generalities,” providing a “foundation in the form of 
theorems or statements about what is true and what is not,” which “can be known 
as certain and true for all time,” so long as “reason and logic as we understand 
them remain valid.”113  Richard A. Posner assesses danger of positive economics 
and positive economic theory of law as simply the opposite of reductionism, 
occurring when economic analyst seeking to make simple economic models more 
complex introduces additional factors such as risk aversion and information 
costs. 114   The greater complexity enhances difficulty of refutation and 
substantiation by empirical observation.115
Hayek made a sharper distinction, however, requiring a higher proof from 
the sciences.  Thus, Hayek assures us once again of the need for spontaneous 
order.  Admittedly, he made a distinction between the domains of private law and 
public law.  By doing so, he allows space for the development of “made” law in 
the affairs of organizations such as governments and their IGOs.  The effect of 
which serves as a possible justification for the persistency and evolution of 
positive law (legal positivism), despite the alleged factually false assumptions of 
constructivist rationalists.  
Non-Western developing countries pose distinctively different problems, 
however, when considering Hayek’s postulations.  The scenario of non-Western 
developing countries does not fit well in Hayek’s scheme of things or his 
discourse concerning taxis, cosmos (Kosmos) and deliberate design.  A problem is 
that he does not directly address the particularities of non-Western nation-states or 
civilization.  Even assuming his discourse bears relevancy on the issue of non-
Western culture, it only does so indirectly.  
Hayek recognized distinctive cultural traditions; however, after being 
recognized they are relegated to minimal importance.  While noting that some 
social orders rest on complex systems of rules of conduct even among the animals 
very low on the evolutionary scale, innate rules (genetically transmitted) and 
learned rules (culturally transmitted) are given minimal attention.116  As opposed 
to a more thorough examination of cultural tradition in terms of non-Western 
civilizations, he leaves the subject minimized in importance.  He wrote, “[S]o that 
new rules may rapidly spread among large groups and, in the case of isolated 
112
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groups, produce distinct ‘cultural traditions.’”117  Hayek when discussing cultural 
tradition is addressing distinguishable cultural traits of Japanese macaque 
monkeys, rather than individuals or persons in the sense of man on the high end of 
the evolutionary scale.118  Admittedly, he does briefly return to the subject of 
culture in an epilogue to Law, Legislation and Liberty.  Hart instructs us that yet 
to be recognized is a present order of society that arose, not by design, but by 
more prevailing effective institutions in the process of competition.  Although 
remaining critical of constructivist rationalism, or the Cartesian approach, he 
implicitly recognized the inherent problem of culture by design.  “Culture is 
neither natural nor artificial, neither genetically transmitted nor rationally 
designed.”119  However, in this respect, his criticism of the Cartesian approach 
may be amiss because arguably a more correct interpretation of the Enlightenment 
is one emphasizing the distinction separating reason from both culture and 
tradition.120
In this respect, Hayek’s discourse is limiting.  While being harshly critical 
of constructivist rationalism and its attendant factually false assumptions, Hayek 
unnecessarily, and somewhat contradictorily, contained himself within the bounds 
of Western conventionalism and parochialism.  The walls of his confinement are 
Western ideology, Western institutions, and Western conceptions of law.  
Nonetheless, his postulations still bear validity and relevance in terms of 
institution building, even as regards to institution building in non-Western nation-
states.  His postulates do so because they both recognized and built on the 
interrelationship between facts and values, and ultimately, a resulting sort of 
Hegelian thesis-antithesis synthesis of facts and value to a higher plane, or higher 
117
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synthesis.121  Hayek most importantly still addressed the problem of science and 
social sciences in exploring the complex social order of humankind.
Legal positivism and natural law continue to influence mainstream 
thinking in international law.122  However, legal positivism arguably has become a 
more dominating force in Western international law and Western domestic law, 
especially in American jurisprudence.  Given Hayek’s discourse, the supposed 
international law embodied, for instance, in the constitution of the WTO regime 
may well survive a theoretical attack for its lack of both genuine cosmos and 
spontaneous order.  Nonetheless, even assuming its theoretical survival from such 
attack, in the terms of the science of law, a donor WTO regime manifesting 
positive law (legal positivism) still engenders problems of the transplant, 
integration and evolution in the recipient domestic law of non-Western cultures 
and nation-states.
This dilemma is also not readily dismissed or resolved by prevailing 
international law theories of dualism and monism.123  An assumed international 
positive law (legal positivism) tolerated in Hayek’s discourse under the public law 
exception must still confront and integrate with the private laws of non-Western 
cultures and nation-states.  As a result the problem of an inevitable clash between 
taxis and cosmos, and the need or lack of spontaneous order in law remains.  The 
theories of dualism and monism, coordination theory,124 inclusive, address issues 
of legal hierarchy, which ultimately leaves in place, rather than resolving 
problems of both transplanting donor laws and evolution of recipient domestic 
laws of non-Western cultures and nation-states.
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(Discussing coordinationism in international law).
Admittedly, in terms of dualism and monism, there are other viewpoints.  
One source subscribes to international law as a sort of evolving, systemic-
cybernetic phenomena.  The legal systems of individual nation-states are seen as 
becoming more interconnected with international legal systems.  The result is a 
connectedness supposedly leading to a world or global legal system.  One source, 
implicitly, contends that notions of modern international law are the by-product of 
an evolution from primitive law as embodied in the principle of comita gentium
(international courtesy) and pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be fulfilled) 
that resulted in more complex, intricate and structured organizations such as the 
UN, EU, OAS and Mercosur.  As a result, there are now international legal 
systems extending jurisdiction over not only nation-states, but also individuals.125
In this respect, theories of dualism and monism are considered more prevalent and 
more capable of responding to the changing juridical needs of a more 
international law oriented, international community.
In terms of non-Western cultures and Western institution building, West 
centric taxonomies when applied to non-West-specific political, socio-economic 
and legal issues, especially economic theory, because of myopic perspectives 
necessarily limited by abstract theory and assumptions often calls into question 
both reliability and practicability of explanation offered by the sciences to explain 
real life phenomenon. 126   Assuming distinctively non-Western-uniquenesses, 
assumptions employed as descriptors of unconventional economic actors such as 
non-Western cultures and nations, are one-dimensional and pallid.127  Any science 
void of real world observation and experiments, arguably, will neglect the 
dimensions and dynamics of culture.  The latter result is no less dramatic when 
social sciences ignore the advent of real world observations and experiments.  
Developing countries and economies in the midst of a supposed transition from 
socialism to capitalism, at least in terms of an American consensus or Washington 
consensus,128 presents, if not produced, the every increasing issue of an ideology 
125 See Ernesto Grün, Globalization of Law: A Systemic and Cybernetic Phenomenon (La 
globalización del Derecho: un fenómeno sistémico y cibernético), (Last visited 17 November 
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rules, —and in the decisions of the Argentine Supreme Court.
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of cultural exceptionalism.  The political economy of reforms presents a scenario 
of uncertain theorems for the West, in its universalistic presumptions of West 
centric logic and reason, as opposed to recognition of arguably existentialistic 
non-Western uniquenesses, and distinctive ontological bases in tradition.  
In particular, the latter presents an impasse in advancing the original goals 
of the Bretton Woods institutions such as the WTO, IMF and World Bank.  It 
does so because it engenders problems of both the genuine integration of 
developing non-Western nation-states, and creation of appropriate norms that will 
lend efficacy and legitimacy, for instance, to a WTO constitution, if not an 
international legal order.  In terms of WTO, without appropriate norms resulting 
in an effective integration and legitimacy, the plight of non-Western nation-states 
is best described as prospective post-WTO memberships that are quasi-in-nature, 
rather than the more equilateral, full entitlement memberships enjoyed by 
dominant Western developed nation-states.  In terms of the accession mechanism, 
a resolution of such issues may warrant a change in WTO, IMF and World Bank 
methodologies and taxonomies, especially West centric models for development 
and integration.  
It is perhaps an issue of a Western evolution to an emic, instead of etic, 
understanding of Sinicism, Islamism and other non-Western cultures. 129
Linguistic anthropologist Kenneth Pike coined the neologisms of emic and etic, 
and distinguished the two as follows.130  An emic “perspective focuses on the 
intrinsic cultural distinctions that are meaningful to the members of a given 
society.”131  Conversely, an etic perspective “relies upon the extrinsic concepts 
and categories that have meaning for scientific observers.”132  An inherent benefit 
of a non-West centric perspective is the resulting recognition of the forces of 
politics and culture, especially, cultural exceptionalism.  Because the concept of 
emic/emit will “insists on the relationship of the observer to the data, as against an 
abstract science in which the observer is somehow eliminated in principle even 
when this would be impossible in fact.” 133   Kenneth Pike sought a greater 
understanding of particular cultures through the intertwining of emic and emit
perspectives, not by exclusive reliance on an emit perspective.134  Pike’s perceived 
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need for a more generalized background framework as a source of human choice 
led him to note what he deemed an etic structure observable in particular cultures.  
This “etic universal background pattern and emic culturally specific pattern” are 
noted to be intertwined.  Thus, the etic and emic are not subject to separate 
treatment, or “first one, then the other,” or as “one outside the mind, the other 
inside it.”135
The new millennium may well constitute a generation where a contest of 
governmental models and taxonomies are arguably dependent on distinctive 
cultures and economies. 136   The latter necessarily produces additional 
considerations exceeding the disciplines of economics and political science, 
especially West centric political economy taxonomies of neo-realism, neo-
liberalism, and development theory (dependency theory).  West centric 
taxonomies destine developing countries and economies to a race to the proverbial 
bottom, in terms of political and economic development.  They do so because they 
seem to condemn developing countries “to subservience or worst: to a state of 
progressive impoverishment and dependence from which only prolonged struggle 
or revolutionary change provides an outlet.”137  Moreover, race to the bottom 
models of globalization ultimately produces a backlash in developed economies 
“as business relocation threatens jobs, wages and environmental standards.”138
Conversely, it may true for developing countries that, “Developmentalism 
resonates with Woodside’s suggestion that a ‘latecomer theory’ . . . dramatizes the 
need for a strong state and a planning intelligentsia to choose the right path to 
development.”139  In terms of developing countries and Hayek’s deliberate design 
thesis, the latter contention may oddly translate into a justification for greater 
reliance on taxis, rather than cosmos, by developing countries.
Nonetheless, in terms of transplanting Western rule of law, a greater 
reliance on taxis, rather than cosmos presents problems, especially when 
anticipating a genuine evolution of Western law in non-Western cultures.  Social 
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science theories void of real world observations and experiments will always be 
based upon Western universalistic presumptions of West centric logic and reason, 
a certain failing resulting in certain non-Western-based biases.  A genuinely real 
world observation of the plight of developing countries is one manifesting 
recognition of distinctive ontological bases in tradition.  Michael Foucault calls it 
the “history of the present” . . . in some others “ontology of the present” . . . or 
even “critical ontology of ourselves”. 140   This critical ontology of ourselves 
allows an understanding of the “limitation of the present epoch,” then paves a way 
to escape its impasse while also helping us in the “search for new possibilities for 
the development of humanity.”  In this sense, the critique understood is conceived 
as an attitude, an ethos.  It represents a philosophical viewpoint manifesting “what 
we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are 
imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.”141
Distinctive ontological bases in tradition, representative of the distinctive 
values and traditions of non-Western cultures constitute their histories of the 
present.  It is from their own distinctive ontological bases in tradition that they 
will experiment with the possibility of going forward, especially in terms of 
political and economic development.  Most importantly, their histories of the 
present will eventually evolve an appropriate constitutional design, be it non-
liberal (illiberal) or liberal political economy constitutional design, or 
combination of both as irredenta’s142 partial success.  As for the final resting 
place for such an evolution in both law and constitutionalism, one can only 
speculate to that end.  
In the final analysis, the question is whether a West centric political 
morality of economics and law is commensurate with a non-West centric political 
morality of economics and law.  This presents the critical issue of whether 
Confucianism, Islamism and other culture phenomenon represent norms in these 
respective modern non-Western societies.  In the event, they represent no more 
than what Hayed described as “articulated rules” or “descriptive rules,” rather 
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than norms, 143  then the issue of distinctive cultures and values, in terms of 
integrating Western taxonomies, especially rule of law, is irrelevant.  In such an 
event, modern debates concerning cultural values and exceptionalism have been 
exercises in political futility, if not mere political rhetoric.  Moreover, it may 
serve to substantiate those distinctive cultural values of non-Western cultures and 
nations that are supposedly grounded in foundational values constitute no more 
than cliques do.  Conversely, if such values genuinely portend general norms then 
they remain increasingly relevant as forces of culture, if not nature, deserving 
greater attention. 
Michel Camdessus, former director of International Monetary Fund 
(IMF),144 noted at a Financing for Development Conference, in Mexico, “If the 
summit could deliver one thing, it should be extending assistance to enhance 
institutional capacity in poor countries.”  It is a problem of achieving year 2015 
Millennium Goals, which were established at the September 2000 UN Millennium 
summit of reducing world poverty.  It is generally perceived that development 
efforts have failed due to lack of institutional capacities to sustain economic 
policies.  Thus, weak institutional capacity presents a major obstacle to economic 
development,145 and advancement of new world economy.  The problem of weak 
institutional capacities in developing countries and economies affects the original 
goals and policies of the Bretton Woods institutions.146
A need for institution building has different consequences for developing 
countries and economies, as opposed to developed countries and economies.  For 
some developing countries, one suspects that the consequence of failing to 
develop adequate institutions in terms of Western taxonomies is continuing 
poverty and lower standards of living.  Comparatively, for developed countries a 
failure of developing countries to rebuild or re-organize its institutional capacities 
translates into a failure of the original goals of the Bretton Woods conference.  
143
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The latter creates a need for developing countries and economies such as the 
United States, EU and other nation-states possessing greater material sources than 
developing countries to engage or promote institution building.  
It is equally a problem of the means by which developed nation-states 
engage institution building, constitution building, inclusive.  Institution building is 
typically engaged by means of political, economic and military power and 
coercion.  A problem of institution building in developing countries is that it has 
now become almost the exclusive provenance of developed countries and 
economies.  This is necessarily true because developed countries and economies 
possess the requisite greater material sources such as political, economic and 
military power than developing countries.  As a result, they are more able to 
engage and promote institution building.  
Moreover, development programs for institution building such as the 
IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, formerly the Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility, are by design of developed countries and their economists, 
and are often perceived by developing countries as not being credible.  
Developing countries more often than not perceive that their development 
agendas are bypassed in the WTO for rules benefiting the rich and powerful, the 
developed countries. It is a recurrent theme in international law and politics, 
especially in the WTO.147
It is beyond dispute that the WTO is an IGO dominated by developed 
countries and economies, rather than developing countries and economies such as 
China.  The latter problem is arguably evidenced by a recent failure in the 10-14 
September 2003 Cancun trade ministry, which partly resulted from a Singapore-
issues-induced division between developed countries and economies, and 
developing countries and economies.148  This growing concern of developing 
countries is further evidenced by their grievances concerning the WTO General 
Council’s (GC) August 1, 2004 decision on the Doha Agenda work program, the 
“July package,” which was meant to restart trade negotiations following the 
failed 2003 Cancun summit.149
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For developing countries, the problem of creating a level playing field has 
been difficult.  Moreover, international law and politics exasperate this on-going 
problem.  Notwithstanding infusion of politics into international law, the gravest 
problem of international law is its inherent weakness.  While providing an 
international arena, if not international playing field for developed countries and 
their power politics, it actually leaves much to desire for the plight of developing 
countries and economies.   
There is a seemingly American policy and consensus of institution 
building, which concerns institution building in non-Western nation-states such as 
China, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other nation-states.  However, notwithstanding 
institution building itself in non-Western nations, an important tangential issue is 
the use of force in institution building.  
In terms of the United States, it is the problem of a historic, 
Americanization of justum bellos, the “just war” doctrine,150 or the principle of 
bellum justum.151  In international law and politics, American unipolarity and its 
attendant unilateral exercises of military force, often accompanied by political and 
economic coercion, seems to be a permanent fixture in the international arena.  It 
is a source of contention for many nation-states, including developed and 
developing nations.152
Self-defense is not the only traditional criteria, condition and constraint 
justifying war.  Given the criteria, conditions and constraint of “just cause” under 
jus ad bellum, war has been historically justified in order to defend one's nation, 
stop a terrible moral wrong and create supposedly just institutions.153  One source 
claims that the American Revolution is the first historic instance of American 
institution building used as justification for war.  It also presents the beginning of 
the Americanization of justum bellos.  The justification for the American 
Revolution concerns not self-defense, rather American colonists fearing extinction 
by the British.  A pivotal concern of American colonists is “no taxation without 
representation and self-government.”  At least in terms of American policy and 
consensus, this important concern provided American colonists with the requisite 
criteria, conditions and constraint of “just cause” under jus ad bellum.  As a result, 
Thomas Jefferson enjoys a certain fame for the proposition that jus ad bellum will 
allow war for institution building, be it to create or enhance institutions.154
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In terms of modern society, at least in terms of the United States, a 
problem of institution building as “just cause” under jus ad bellum is its historical, 
repetitive use throughout U.S. history, and eventual extension and expansion into 
the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive first strike.155  History is full of instances of 
American institution building.  From the American Revolution to the War on Iraq, 
history provides plentiful example. 
In terms of international law and politics, Hayek also offers a possible 
solution to the impasse of an American policy of institution building, including 
constitution building, which concerns institution building in non-Western nation-
states such as China and other nation-states.  Hayek’s discourse on taxis, cosmos 
and deliberate design offers a possible solution to the problem of what appears to 
be a perceived political necessity of an American polity that is the necessity of 
militarism by an American hegemonic military power in institution building.
Hayek’s discourse on sources of power may offer America an alternative 
path in international relations and international law.  An alternative path that 
recognizes and distinguishes “made” (taxis) from grown (cosmos) sources of rules 
and order, and questions a staid practice of transplanting Western 
constitutionalism in non-Western nation-states.  In this respect, Hayek’s earlier 
discourse in taxis, cosmos (Kosmos) and deliberate design may offer a new path 
for U.S. international relations simply because of an alternative taxonomy offered 
via a new understanding of world constitutionalism, including constitution and 
institution building.  The result could be the formulation of a United States 
international relations theory that could conceivably evolve into an alternative 
preventive war strategy, as opposed to existing and historic theories grounded in a 
seemingly evolving and expanding pre-emptive first strike doctrine.  
Notwithstanding U.S. international relations, Hayek’s discourse may 
equally influence international law in general.  Admittedly, a nation’s intervention 
into the affairs of another nation-state for explicit or implicit purpose of institution 
building is far from being proscribed as jus cogens.  The latter is mostly due to the 
inherent weaknesses in international law, especially problems attendant to 
enforcement of international norms.  However, it remains plausible that such 
interventions for purposes of institution building could eventually be proscribed 
by rules of general international law.  It is especially here that Hayek’s earlier 
discourse possibly offers an impetus for an evolution in international law and 
“just war.”
155 See Amy E. Eckert & Manooher Mofidi, Doctrine or Doctrinaire—The First Strike 
Doctrine and Preemptive Self-defense Under International Law, 12 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 117, 
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Admittedly, there are several obvious problems.  First, the American 
historical practice of institution building arguably ranges in a period from its 
American Revolution to War on Iraq.  It presents a practice that is so engrained in 
American political culture that it may present a particular law in terms of 
international law.  Moreover, in terms of President Bush’s post 9/11 Doctrine and 
the possibility of instant customary international law, one source notes that the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) expressed in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases156 that a short passage of time is not an absolute bar to forming new rules of 
customary international law. 157 In this respect, such practice that is intervention 
into affairs of a nation for purposes of institution building may enjoy the status of 
a legal exercise of force, albeit by economic and political coercion, and arguably 
by military force, in terms of international law.  
Secondly, Hayek’s critical discourse on rules and order, and deliberate 
design, calls into question well engrained and established institutional principles 
of an American polity.  Because in America the critical concern of institution 
building has experienced a growth and evolution paralleling a growth and 
evolution of American politics and foreign affairs (international relations).  
Moreover, Hayek’s discourse threatens an existing American polity and American 
ideals, all of which necessarily forces America to rethink its national priorities, 
international relations and, most importantly, its place in the international 
community.   
Neo-realism, neo-liberalism and dependency theory, are all West centric 
taxonomies that share a commonality, in that they explicitly or implicitly pursue 
156
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goal of institution building in non-Western cultures and developing countries.  In 
terms of neo-liberalism, China presents ample example.  The socio-economic 
environment of China begs the question of whether development is justified for 
the sake of development itself.158  If the market is truly at work, then China is 
suffering from Hayek’s spontaneous order, because the numbers seem to indicate 
a populace suffering from the negative feedback of the market system adjusting to 
its socio-economic environment.159  Moreover, there are undoubtedly countless 
numbers of other such examples of the so-called negative feedback of the market 
in China and other developing countries seeking to make transition to market 
economy.  Filipino academic and writer Walden Bello said: “Whether in the form 
of Thatcherism in Britain, Reaganism in the US or structural adjustment in Africa 
and Latin America, the free-market model has resulted in weak growth or 
stagnation accompanied by greater income inequality, a greater percentage of the 
people living under the poverty line and serious environmental damage.”160
In terms of economic theory, issues of values and ethos, if not ontological 
concerns influence distribution.  Because survival and growth are dependent on 
human organizations, creating surpluses over immediate needs and wants.  
Conversely, a new world order, or new capitalism, perhaps because of an etic-
158
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centered-perspective resulted in many people, especially non-Western cultures, 
becoming marginalized while new economic gains went to the few.161
Perhaps neo-realism is more so a concern of international relations theory, 
because when we are talking about political neo-realism, we are addressing 
American militarism, or an American hegemony employing military force in 
institution building.162  Therefore, if there is a negative feedback, it is perhaps a 
non-economic variety not envisioned by Hayek.  In terms of Iraq, Afghanistan 
and other developing countries, the negative feedback has been the death of 
military personnel, civilian casualties of war, poverty and other societal ills.163
Hayek in his writings is truly fighting the enemies of the Second World 
War and the cold war.  His writings are arguably pro-American, pro-liberal in the 
sense of classical liberalism that is neo-conservatism, not of the variety of the 
misuse of nomenclature “liberal” by an American democratic party, anti-socialism 
and anti-totalitarianism.  However, the contemporary importance of his writings 
does not lie in these seemingly obvious characterizations.  His contemporary 
importance stems from his basic assault on the very foundations of American and 
Western values, and institutions, including the institution of Western 
constitutionalism.  America and other Western countries and cultures share a 
commonality of so-called liberal democratic values.  Western institutions such as 
governments and constitutions are grounded on foundational values emanating 
mostly from the thoughts of the sixteenth century European intellectual thinkers 
of the Enlightenment era such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. 164   Hayek 
maintained that the doctrinaires of these great thinkers, the constructivist 
rationalists, social contract theorists or contactarians, were grounded on factually 
false assumptions.  Assuming arguendo Hayek was correct, Western institutions 
and values are called into question, especially Western institution building in non-
Western cultures and nation-states.  
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The problems are obvious.  If Hayek was correct, then Western society 
must rethink its priorities and policies, if not ideologies. 165   It is especially 
ideology that may warrant re-direction because “ideologies are modes of 
consciousness, containing the criteria for interpreting social reality,” and thus 
“they help to define as well as to legitimate collective needs and interests.”166  If 
Hayek was correct, Western society must also rethink a policy of Western 
institution building that intends to transplant Western institutions and Western 
values into non-Western cultures and nation-states.  
Moreover, Hayek’s discourse begs Western society to rethink its seeming 
goal of transforming international law into a sort of transnational law that 
challenges the foundations of traditional state sovereignty, which has been 
strongly entrenched since the Peace (Treaties) of Westphalia (1648).167  A West 
centric new world order and model presupposes agreed upon principles, if not 
assumptions, embracing Western and non-Western cultures and economies.  
China presents a classic example of the problem with this model of a new world 
order.  The principles for a new world order proposed by China substantially 
differ from the vision of a new order designed by the West, especially the U.S.  In 
particular, China proposed two specific principles embracing the issue of 
sovereignty.  First, China proposed, “to adhere to the principles of mutual respect 
for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression and non-
interference in each others’ internal affairs.”  Second, and most importantly, 
China proposed, “to adhere to the principle of the sovereignty equality of all the 
countries in the world.” 168  One source noted that China, as a rising power is 
165 See Jonathan Zasloff, Law And The Shaping Of American Foreign Policy: From The 
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anxious about possible Western imposed values backed by Western, especially 
U.S., collective intervention.169
In terms of Western institution building, one must also consider whether 
this seemingly on-going evolution in international law to transnational law is end-
connected, and if so, to what end.170  Because if the intended end-connection is a 
greater permeation of Western institutions in non-Western cultures and nation-
states, then Western society is ultimately transplanting an entity that Hayek found 
to be based on the factually false assumptions of the constructivist rationalists.  
The result is an end-connection, in terms of Hayek’s discourse that would equally 
be based upon false assumptions, or, in short, another road that should not have 
been traveled.  
Admittedly, Hayek’s may have been incorrect.  Nonetheless, his writing 
begs Western society to consider its societal underpinnings, especially the 
Western ideal of liberal democracy, its Western universalizing cosmopolitanism, 
and especially Western institution building in non-Western cultures and nation-
states.  In terms of China, Afghanistan, Iraq and other developing countries, it 
seems naïve to suggest that economic development by Western institution 
building is justified by the assertion of development, simply, for the sake of 
development itself.  
The reality of a new world order, or global economy, necessitates that we 
presuppose a purposefulness prescribing a requisite end-connection for Western 
institution building.  Because the resulting end-connection is deliberate design 
based in part on the Bretton Woods conference; in part on the founding of the UN; 
in part on the founding of the UN predecessor, the League of Nation;171 and in 
part on the thesis of Immanuel Kant in Perpetual Peace (1853). 172   Kant 
suggested a treaty of perpetual peace for republican forms of governments.  
Western scholarship and authority translated Kant’s Perpetual Peace into the 
169 Id., at 9.  “It is clear that China, as a rising power, worries a US domination, or hegemony, 
and as a socialist country, is anxious about a possible Western imposed values backed by their 
‘collective intervention.’”  Id.
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democratic peace thesis that democracies do not fight each other.173  The problem 
of Kant’s Perpetual Peace as translated by Western authority, and in its 
application by Western authority vis-à-vis Western taxonomies, is that it does not 
account for the so-called illiberal nation-states, the non-Western cultures and 
nation-states.  It was equally a problem of classical international law (1648-
1918)174 and perhaps a remnant manifest in modern international law.  
Moreover, Hayek did not discern for us the distinctions between politics 
and economics, or economics and law, nor between politics and law.  The latter 
also begs the question of whether he should have accomplished this feat.  Because 
given a failure to do so, leaves us without a hierarchy of sorts that describes 
effective institution building, that is, should a polity be first built or re-built, rather 
than a legal system or economic system.  Most problematic are the original goals 
of the Bretton Woods conference and especially that of a Western universalizing 
cosmopolitanism, because Western institution building, by bargaining or military 
force, is clearly based upon theories of the constructivist rationalists (Cartesian 
rationalism), which Hayek maintained were based upon factually false 
assumptions.  It is here that Hayek challenged the West and its institutions, 
especially institution building, in a very fundamental way.
Hayek does not reveal anything new to the world, rather an extension of 
his earlier thesis on spontaneous order mostly concerning business-cycle theory 
and comparative economic systems.175  He approached the subject of law as the 
science of law (jurisprudence) in a manner resembling his approach to the science 
of economics.  It is a search for clarity in the obscure by means of economic 
methodology, an approach seemingly contradictive of his criticism of 
constructivist rationalists, or Cartesian rationalism.  Perhaps it is the problem of 
economic modeling and attendant general assumption that economic actors taken 
individually or en masse are rational decision makers.  
The formalism of Hayek in employing economic tools and a market order 
to assess societal problems leaves much to desire.176  The idea of a spontaneous 
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order is grounded in concepts of pure economics that searches for a world where 
there are perfect market systems.  Adam Smith’s argument against governmental 
intervention was grounded in a philosophy of laissez faire economics that 
assumed the existence of perfectly competitive markets.  The two major thesis of 
Adam Smith was that government should pursue a policy of laissez faire and that 
the resulting distribution of income should be unequal.  Albeit reality suggest 
otherwise, the latter became the economic ideology of Western civilization and 
culture, an ideology that Western culture has attempted to promote, if not 
transplant by institution building, in non-Western cultures, and underdeveloped 
and developing countries.177
So-called capitalism, if it ever actually existed, is better referred to as the 
Western ideal model of economic systems.  This market system experienced 
profound changes beginning in the 1970s because of information technology, so-
called globalization and financial deregulation.178  For Hayek, perhaps it was a 
dreaded “Rousseauesque nostalgia” 179  serving as reminder of the Cartesian 
approach that drove him to search for solutions in the balancing of society by the 
forces of the market order.  
In a perfect production environment, the forces of positive and negative 
feedbacks supposedly allows a market system to act as a self-correcting system.180
However, in reality, there are the negative feedbacks that are destabilizing.181  The 
problem of negative feedbacks in a real world where the target of economic 
theories are nation-states consisting of humankind are destabilizing feedbacks 
such as poverty, unemployment and war.  In terms of nation-states such as China, 
Afghanistan and Iraq, it difficult to envision positive feedbacks, as in typical 
business cycles, that will ameliorate destabilizing feedbacks or vicious spirals 
such as poverty, unemployment and war.  
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An answer to the societal problem of vicious spirals of poverty, 
unemployment and war may not lie in the science of economics such as Coase’s 
Theorem, Pareto Efficiency and the Kaldor-Hicks Theory, and Public Choice and 
Arrow’s Impossibility Theory. 182   Economics, not unlike law, “is a biased 
undertaking in that the use of any particular economic model embraces specific 
assumptions and value statements and consequently any outcome generated by the 
use of such a model will be biased.”183  For Alfred Marshall (1842-1924), the 
father of neoclassicism, a definition of economics had to encompass the terms of 
political economy and economics.  As a result, because the term of political 
economy implied that economics and politics were interrelated then economics, as 
a social science, was intimately connected with normative judgments. 184
Economic modeling, especially the neoclassical economic model, is based upon 
assumptions reflecting these biases.185  In terms of a new world order or global 
economy, there are no quick fixes to the conflicts of Western international law,
Western rule of law and especially Western institution building confronting non-
Western cultures, developing countries and economies. 
Despite the shortcomings of Hayek’s spontaneous order, there is a positive 
side, perhaps even a positive feedback.  Hayek left us with a “what if” question 
and returns us to that initial opening of Pandora’s Box, or perhaps the initial onset 
of neo-realism, neo-liberalism, developmentalism, globalism, transnationalism 
and other concepts, precepts and adjectives justifying institution building by 
bargaining and military force.  In terms of new world order, institution building 
by necessity requires fundamental changes in governmental structures in non-
Western cultures and nation-states such as China, Afghanistan and Iraq.  Such 
changes are being prompted by means of political, economic and military powers 
of the U.S. and other developed nation-states, and IGOs dominated by developed 
nation-states such as the WTO.  Though arguably well intended there remains the 
question of what will eventually result from the introduction of Western 
institutions into non-Western cultures and developing countries.
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CONCLUSION
Although Hayek may have had contrary intentions, his discourse on taxis 
and cosmos (Kosmos), and spontaneous order, nonetheless, challenges a modern 
Western world to rethink its priorities and policies, and perhaps even foundational 
ideologies, especially in the realm of rebuilding non-Western cultures and 
developing countries.  The contemporary relevance of Hayek’s discourse also 
brings one to stark realization of the changing nature of our world, especially in 
terms of a post-second world war and post-cold war.  For Western society, the old 
enemies, that is, Nazism during the Second World War and communism during 
the cold war, are no longer at the doorstep.  Our past enemies once wore the faces 
of Nazism and communism.  Samuel Huntington foretold that modern world 
reality would displace the ideological conflict of the cold war with cultural 
conflict.186  The greatest danger to Western society, if not humankind, would be 
Western society’s replacement on the face of its enemy, the face of non-Western 
cultures and developing countries.  
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